On the Hypotheses which lie at the Bases of Geometry: the Plan and the Application to Space
Original title: Über die Hypothesen, welche der Geometrie zu Grunde liegen (German)
Bernhard Riemann (1826–1866)
Translated by William Kingdon Clifford (1845–1879), 1873
Lecture at Göttingen, 10 June 1854; published 1868

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Rights: German original read in 1854 and printed in 1868; Riemann died in 1866. The translator, W. K. Clifford, died in 1879; the translation was published in Nature in 1873. The second part is at https://archive.org/details/paper-doi-10_1038_008036a0. Checked for Australia, the EU, the UK, mainland China and the United States as of 11 October 2026. Guidance, not legal advice.
Source: Internet Archive (scan of Nature, 1 May 1873), https://archive.org/details/paper-doi-10_1038_008014a0 (retrieved 2026-10-11)
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Plan of the Investigation

It is known that geometry assumes, as things given, both the notion of space and the first principles of constructions in space. She gives definitions of them which are merely nominal, while the true determinations appear in the form of axioms. The relation of these assumptions remains consequently in darkness; we neither perceive whether and how far their connection is necessary, nor, a priori, whether it is possible.

From Euclid to Legendre (to name the most famous of modern reforming geometers) this darkness was cleared up neither by mathematicians nor by such philosophers as concerned themselves with it. The reason of this is doubtless that the general notion of multiply extended magnitudes (in which space-magnitudes are included) remained entirely unworked. I have in the first place, therefore, set myself the task of constructing the notion of a multiply extended magnitude out of general notions of magnitude. It will follow from this that a multiply extended magnitude is capable of different measure-relations, and consequently that space is only a particular case of a triply extended magnitude. But hence flows as a necessary consequence that the propositions of geometry cannot be derived from general notions of magnitude, but that the properties which distinguish space from other conceivable triply extended magnitudes are only to be deduced from experience. Thus arises the problem, to discover the simplest matters of fact from which the measure-relations of space may be determined; a problem which from the nature of the case is not completely determinate, since there may be several systems of matters of fact which suffice to determine the measure-relations of space—the most important system for our present purpose being that which Euclid has laid down as a foundation. These matters of fact are—like all matters of fact—not necessary, but only of empirical certainty; they are hypotheses. We may therefore investigate their probability, which within the limits of observation is of course very great, and inquire about the justice of their extension beyond the limits of observation, on the side both of the infinitely great and of the infinitely small.


III. Application to Space

§ 1.—By means of these inquiries into the determination of the measure relations of an n-fold extent the conditions may be declared which are necessary and sufficient to determine the metric properties of space, if we assume the independence of line-length from position and expressibility of the line-element as the square root of a quadric differential, that is to say, flatness in the smallest parts.

First, they may be expressed thus: that the curvature at each point is zero in three surface-directions; and thence the metric properties of space are determined if the sum of the angles of a triangle is always equal to two right angles.

Secondly, if we assume with Euclid not merely an existence of lines independent of position, but of bodies also, it follows that the curvature is everywhere constant; and then the sum of the angles is determined in all triangles when it is known in one.

Thirdly, one might, instead of taking the length of lines to be independent of position and direction, assume also an independence of their length and direction from position. According to this conception changes or differences of position are complex magnitudes expressible in three independent units.

§ 2.—In the course of our previous inquiries, we first distinguished between the relations of extension or partition and the relations of measure, and found that with the same extensive properties, different measure-relations were conceivable; we then investigated the system of simple size-fixings by which the measure-relations of space are completely determined, and of which all propositions about them are a necessary consequence; it remains to discuss the question how, in what degree, and to what extent these assumptions are borne out by experience. In this respect there is a real distinction between mere extensive relations, and measure relations; in so far as in the former, where the possible cases form a discrete manifoldness, the declarations of experience are indeed not quite certain, but still not inaccurate; while in the latter, where the possible cases form a continuous manifoldness, every determination from experience remains always inaccurate, be the probability ever so great that it is nearly exact. This consideration becomes important in the extensions of these empirical determinations beyond the limits of observation to the infinitely great and infinitely small; since the latter may clearly become more inaccurate beyond the limits of observation, but not the former.

In the extension of space-construction to the infinitely great, we must distinguish between unboundedness and infinite extent, the former belongs to the extent relations, the latter to the measure-relations. That space is an unbounded three-fold manifoldness, is an assumption which is developed by every conception of the outer world; according to which every instant the region of real perception is completed and the possible positions of a sought object are constructed, and which by these applications is for ever confirming itself. The unboundedness of space possesses in this way a greater empirical certainty than any external experience. But its infinite extent by no means follows from this; on the other hand if we assume independence of bodies from position, and therefore ascribe to space constant curvature, it must necessarily be finite provided this curvature has ever so small a positive value. If we prolong all the geodesics starting in a given surface-element, we should obtain an unbounded surface of constant curvature, i.e., a surface which in a flat manifoldness of three dimensions would take the form of a sphere, and consequently be finite.

§ 3. The questions about the infinitely great are for the interpretation of nature useless questions. But this is not the case with the questions about the infinitely small. It is upon the exactness with which we follow phenomena into the infinitely small that our knowledge of their causal relations essentially depends. The progress of recent centuries in the knowledge of mechanics depends almost entirely on the exactness of the construction which has become possible through the invention of the infinitesimal calculus, and through the simple principles discovered by Archimedes, Galileo, and Newton, and used by modern physic. But in the natural sciences which are still in want of simple principles for such constructions, we seek to discover the causal relations by following the phenomena into great minuteness, so far as the microscope permits. Questions about the measure-relations of space in the infinitely small are not therefore superfluous questions.

If we suppose that bodies exist independently of position, the curvature is everywhere constant, and it then results from astronomical measurements that it cannot be different from zero; or at any rate its reciprocal must be an area in comparison with which the range of our telescopes may be neglected. But if this independence of bodies from position does not exist, we cannot draw conclusions from metric relations of the great, to those of the infinitely small; in that case the curvature at each point may have an arbitrary value in three directions, provided that the total curvature of every measurable portion of space does not differ sensibly from zero. Still more complicated relations may exist if we no longer suppose the linear element expressible as the square root of a quadric differential. Now it seems that the empirical notions on which the metrical determinations of space are founded, the notion of a solid body and of a ray of light, cease to be valid for the infinitely small. We are therefore quite at liberty to suppose that the metric relations of space in the infinitely small do not conform to the hypotheses of geometry; and we ought in fact to suppose it, if we can thereby obtain a simpler explanation of phenomena.

The question of the validity of the hypotheses of geometry in the infinitely small is bound up with the question of the ground of the metric relations of space. In this last question, which we may still regard as belonging to the doctrine of space, is found the application of the remark made above; that in a discrete manifoldness, the ground of its metric relations is given in the notion of it, while in a continuous manifoldness, this ground must come from outside. Either therefore the reality which underlies space must form a discrete manifoldness, or we must seek the ground of its metric relations outside it, in binding forces which act upon it.

The answer to these questions can only be got by starting from the conception of phenomena which has hitherto been justified by experience, and which Newton assumed as a foundation, and by making in this conception the successive changes required by facts which it cannot explain. Researches starting from general notions, like the investigation we have just made, can only be useful in preventing this work from being hampered by too narrow views, and progress in knowledge of the interdependence of things from being checked by traditional prejudices.

This leads us into the domain of another science, of physic, into which the object of this work does not allow us to go to-day.