Leviathan, Chapter V: Of Reason, and Science 推理不过是计算：《利维坦》第五章 托马斯·霍布斯 Thomas Hobbes（1588–1679） 1651 年 冷冻图书馆 · 开架书库 · S-007206 · https://coldlibrary.com/s/007206 权利：1651 年首次出版，霍布斯卒于 1679 年。已按澳大利亚、欧盟、英国、中国大陆和美国的规则核对（截至 2026 年 10 月 11 日）。仅供参考，不是法律意见。 来源：Project Gutenberg #3207，https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/3207/pg3207.txt（取于 2026-10-11） 中文译文：Claude（AI），2026 · CC0 1.0 生成于 2026-10-14，来自 https://coldlibrary.com/open-stacks/hobbes-reason-is-reckoning ---- Reason What It Is When a man Reasoneth, hee does nothing els but conceive a summe totall, from Addition of parcels; or conceive a Remainder, from Substraction of one summe from another: which (if it be done by Words,) is conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole; or from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other part. And though in some things, (as in numbers,) besides Adding and Substracting, men name other operations, as Multiplying and Dividing; yet they are the same; for Multiplication, is but Addition together of things equall; and Division, but Substracting of one thing, as often as we can. These operations are not incident to Numbers onely, but to all manner of things that can be added together, and taken one out of another. For as Arithmeticians teach to adde and substract in Numbers; so the Geometricians teach the same in Lines, Figures (solid and superficiall,) Angles, Proportions, Times, degrees of Swiftnesse, Force, Power, and the like; The Logicians teach the same in Consequences Of Words; adding together Two Names, to make an Affirmation; and Two Affirmations, to make a syllogisme; and Many syllogismes to make a Demonstration; and from the Summe, or Conclusion of a syllogisme, they substract one Proposition, to finde the other. Writers of Politiques, adde together Pactions, to find mens Duties; and Lawyers, Lawes and Facts, to find what is Right and Wrong in the actions of private men. In summe, in what matter soever there is place for Addition and Substraction, there also is place for Reason; and where these have no place, there Reason has nothing at all to do. Reason Defined Out of all which we may define, (that is to say determine,) what that is, which is meant by this word Reason, when wee reckon it amongst the Faculties of the mind. For Reason, in this sense, is nothing but Reckoning (that is, Adding and Substracting) of the Consequences of generall names agreed upon, for the Marking and Signifying of our thoughts; I say Marking them, when we reckon by our selves; and Signifying, when we demonstrate, or approve our reckonings to other men. Right Reason Where And as in Arithmetique, unpractised men must, and Professors themselves may often erre, and cast up false; so also in any other subject of Reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men, may deceive themselves, and inferre false Conclusions; Not but that Reason it selfe is always Right Reason, as well as Arithmetique is a certain and infallible art: But no one mans Reason, nor the Reason of any one number of men, makes the certaintie; no more than an account is therefore well cast up, because a great many men have unanimously approved it. And therfore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their own accord, set up for right Reason, the Reason of some Arbitrator, or Judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their controversie must either come to blowes, or be undecided, for want of a right Reason constituted by Nature; so is it also in all debates of what kind soever: And when men that think themselves wiser than all others, clamor and demand right Reason for judge; yet seek no more, but that things should be determined, by no other mens reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men, as it is in play after trump is turned, to use for trump on every occasion, that suite whereof they have most in their hand. For they do nothing els, that will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for right Reason, and that in their own controversies: bewraying their want of right Reason, by the claym they lay to it. The Use Of Reason The Use and End of Reason, is not the finding of the summe, and truth of one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions, and settled significations of names; but to begin at these; and proceed from one consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the last Conclusion, without a certainty of all those Affirmations and Negations, on which it was grounded, and inferred. As when a master of a family, in taking an account, casteth up the summs of all the bills of expence, into one sum; and not regarding how each bill is summed up, by those that give them in account; nor what it is he payes for; he advantages himselfe no more, than if he allowed the account in grosse, trusting to every of the accountants skill and honesty; so also in Reasoning of all other things, he that takes up conclusions on the trust of Authors, and doth not fetch them from the first Items in every Reckoning, (which are the significations of names settled by definitions), loses his labour; and does not know any thing; but onely beleeveth. Of Error And Absurdity When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done in particular things, (as when upon the sight of any one thing, wee conjecture what was likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon it;) if that which he thought likely to follow, followes not; or that which he thought likely to have preceded it, hath not preceded it, this is called ERROR; to which even the most prudent men are subject. But when we Reason in Words of generall signification, and fall upon a generall inference which is false; though it be commonly called Error, it is indeed an ABSURDITY, or senseless Speech. For Error is but a deception, in presuming that somewhat is past, or to come; of which, though it were not past, or not to come; yet there was no impossibility discoverable. But when we make a generall assertion, unlesse it be a true one, the possibility of it is unconceivable. And words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call Absurd, insignificant, and Non-sense. And therefore if a man should talk to me of a Round Quadrangle; or Accidents Of Bread In Cheese; or Immaterial Substances; or of A Free Subject; A Free Will; or any Free, but free from being hindred by opposition, I should not say he were in an Errour; but that his words were without meaning; that is to say, Absurd. I have said before, (in the second chapter,) that a Man did excell all other Animals in this faculty, that when he conceived any thing whatsoever, he was apt to enquire the consequences of it, and what effects he could do with it. And now I adde this other degree of the same excellence, that he can by words reduce the consequences he findes to generall Rules, called Theoremes, or Aphorismes; that is, he can Reason, or reckon, not onely in number; but in all other things, whereof one may be added unto, or substracted from another. But this priviledge, is allayed by another; and that is, by the priviledge of Absurdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man onely. And of men, those are of all most subject to it, that professe Philosophy. For it is most true that Cicero sayth of them somewhere; that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of Philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the Definitions, or Explications of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used onely in Geometry; whose Conclusions have thereby been made indisputable. Causes Of Absurditie The first cause of Absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of Method; in that they begin not their Ratiocination from Definitions; that is, from settled significations of their words: as if they could cast account, without knowing the value of the numerall words, One, Two, and Three. And whereas all bodies enter into account upon divers considerations, (which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter;) these considerations being diversly named, divers absurdities proceed from the confusion, and unfit connexion of their names into assertions. And therefore The second cause of Absurd assertions, I ascribe to the giving of names of Bodies, to Accidents; or of Accidents, to Bodies; As they do, that say, Faith Is Infused, or Inspired; when nothing can be Powred, or Breathed into any thing, but body; and that, Extension is Body; that Phantasmes are Spirits, &c. The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the Accidents of Bodies Without Us, to the Accidents of our Own Bodies; as they do that say, the Colour Is In The Body; The Sound Is In The Ayre, &c. The fourth, to the giving of the names of Bodies, to Names, or Speeches; as they do that say, that There Be Things Universall; that A Living Creature Is Genus, or A Generall Thing, &c. The fifth, to the giving of the names of Accidents, to Names and Speeches; as they do that say, The Nature Of A Thing Is In Its Definition; A Mans Command Is His Will; and the like. The sixth, to the use of Metaphors, Tropes, and other Rhetoricall figures, in stead of words proper. For though it be lawfull to say, (for example) in common speech, The Way Goeth, Or Leadeth Hither, Or Thither, The Proverb Sayes This Or That (whereas wayes cannot go, nor Proverbs speak;) yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be admitted. The seventh, to names that signifie nothing; but are taken up, and learned by rote from the Schooles, as Hypostatical, Transubstantiate, Consubstantiate, Eternal-now, and the like canting of Schoole-men. To him that can avoyd these things, it is not easie to fall into any absurdity, unlesse it be by the length of an account; wherein he may perhaps forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good principles. For who is so stupid, as both to mistake in Geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects his error to him? Science By this it appears that Reason is not as Sense, and Memory, borne with us; nor gotten by Experience onely; as Prudence is; but attayned by Industry; first in apt imposing of Names; and secondly by getting a good and orderly Method in proceeding from the Elements, which are Names, to Assertions made by Connexion of one of them to another; and so to syllogismes, which are the Connexions of one Assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the Consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is it, men call SCIENCE. And whereas Sense and Memory are but knowledge of Fact, which is a thing past, and irrevocable; Science is the knowledge of Consequences, and dependance of one fact upon another: by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to do something els when we will, or the like, another time; Because when we see how any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner; when the like causes come into our power, wee see how to make it produce the like effects. Children therefore are not endued with Reason at all, till they have attained the use of Speech: but are called Reasonable Creatures, for the possibility apparent of having the use of Reason in time to come. And the most part of men, though they have the use of Reasoning a little way, as in numbring to some degree; yet it serves them to little use in common life; in which they govern themselves, some better, some worse, according to their differences of experience, quicknesse of memory, and inclinations to severall ends; but specially according to good or evill fortune, and the errors of one another. For as for Science, or certain rules of their actions, they are so farre from it, that they know not what it is. Geometry they have thought Conjuring: but for other Sciences, they who have not been taught the beginnings, and some progresse in them, that they may see how they be acquired and generated, are in this point like children, that having no thought of generation, are made believe by the women, that their brothers and sisters are not born, but found in the garden. But yet they that have no Science, are in better, and nobler condition with their naturall Prudence; than men, that by mis-reasoning, or by trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd generall rules. For ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set men so farre out of their way, as relying on false rules, and taking for causes of what they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather causes of the contrary. To conclude, The Light of humane minds is Perspicuous Words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; Reason is the Pace; Encrease of Science, the Way; and the Benefit of man-kind, the End. And on the contrary, Metaphors, and senslesse and ambiguous words, are like Ignes Fatui; and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition, or contempt. Prudence & Sapience, With Their Difference As, much Experience, is Prudence; so, is much Science, Sapience. For though wee usually have one name of Wisedome for them both; yet the Latines did always distinguish between Prudentia and Sapientia, ascribing the former to Experience, the later to Science. But to make their difference appeare more cleerly, let us suppose one man endued with an excellent naturall use, and dexterity in handling his armes; and another to have added to that dexterity, an acquired Science, of where he can offend, or be offended by his adversarie, in every possible posture, or guard: The ability of the former, would be to the ability of the later, as Prudence to Sapience; both usefull; but the later infallible. But they that trusting onely to the authority of books, follow the blind blindly, are like him that trusting to the false rules of the master of fence, ventures praesumptuously upon an adversary, that either kills, or disgraces him. Signes Of Science The signes of Science, are some, certain and infallible; some, uncertain. Certain, when he that pretendeth the Science of any thing, can teach the same; that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to another: Uncertain, when onely some particular events answer to his pretence, and upon many occasions prove so as he sayes they must. Signes of prudence are all uncertain; because to observe by experience, and remember all circumstances that may alter the successe, is impossible. But in any businesse, whereof a man has not infallible Science to proceed by; to forsake his own natural judgement, and be guided by generall sentences read in Authors, and subject to many exceptions, is a signe of folly, and generally scorned by the name of Pedantry. And even of those men themselves, that in Councells of the Common-wealth, love to shew their reading of Politiques and History, very few do it in their domestique affaires, where their particular interest is concerned; having Prudence enough for their private affaires: but in publique they study more the reputation of their owne wit, than the successe of anothers businesse. ---- 中文译文 · Claude（AI）译 推理是什么 一个人推理的时候，他所做的不过是把各部分相加，得出一个总和；或者从一个总和中减去另一个，得出一个余数。如果这是用语词来做的，那就是从所有部分的名称推出整体的名称，或者从整体和一个部分的名称推出另一个部分的名称。虽然在某些事情上（例如在数上），人们在加和减之外，还说到别的运算，比如乘和除，可它们其实是一样的：乘不过是把相等的东西加在一起，除不过是尽可能多次地减去同一个东西。这些运算并不只适用于数，而是适用于一切可以彼此相加、可以从中取出的东西。正如算术家教人对数做加减，几何学家也教人对线、图形（立体的和平面的）、角、比例、时间、速度的快慢、力、能力等等做同样的事；逻辑学家教人对语词的推论做同样的事：把两个名称加在一起，构成一个肯定命题；把两个命题加在一起，构成一个三段论；把许多三段论加在一起，构成一个证明；再从一个三段论的总和，也就是结论中，减去一个命题，求出另一个。政论家把各种契约加在一起，求出人们的义务；律师把法律和事实加在一起，求出私人行为中何为正当、何为不当。总而言之，凡是可以做加减的地方，就有推理的余地；凡是加减用不上的地方，推理也就毫无用武之地。 推理的定义 由此我们可以界定（也就是确定）：当我们把“推理”这个词算作心灵的一种能力时，它指的是什么。在这个意义上，推理不过是计算（也就是相加和相减），计算的是那些为了标记和表示我们的思想而约定的一般名称所带来的推论。我说“标记”，是指我们自己计算的时候；说“表示”，是指我们向别人论证、让别人认可我们的计算的时候。 正确的推理在哪里 正如在算术里，没有训练的人一定会出错，就连教授们也常常可能出错，算出错误的结果；在任何其他的推理题目上也是如此，最能干、最专心、最有训练的人，也可能欺骗自己，推出错误的结论。这并不是说推理本身不总是正确的推理，正如算术本身是一门确定无误的技艺；而是说，没有哪一个人的推理，也没有哪一群人的推理，能够造成确定性；正如一笔账，并不因为有许多人一致认可，就算得正确。因此，当一笔账有争议时，双方必须自愿推举某个仲裁人或法官的推理作为正确的推理，双方都服从他的裁决；否则，由于缺少自然设定的正确推理，他们的争议要么诉诸拳脚，要么悬而不决。在一切争论中都是如此。而那些自以为比别人都聪明的人，大声要求以正确的推理来裁判，其实只是想让事情由他们自己的推理、而不是别人的推理来决定；这在人类社会里，就像在打牌时，翻出王牌之后，每次都要拿自己手里最多的那一门花色当王牌一样，令人无法容忍。因为他们所做的，无非是要让自己的每一种激情，在支配他们的时候，都被当作正确的推理，而且是在他们自己的争执之中；他们对正确推理的这番要求，恰恰暴露了他们缺少正确的推理。 推理的用处 推理的用处和目的，不在于求出离最初的定义和确定的名称意义很远的一个或几个推论的总和与真理，而在于从这些定义和意义开始，由一个推论推到另一个推论。因为如果作为依据和推导前提的所有肯定和否定都不确定，最后的结论也就不可能确定。就像一家之主在算账时，把所有开支账单的总数加成一个总数，却不管每张账单是怎样被交账的人加起来的，也不管自己付的是什么钱，那么他得到的好处，并不比整个笼统地认可这笔账、全凭每个记账人的本事和诚实更多；在推理其他一切事情时也是如此：一个人如果凭着对作者的信任接受结论，而不从每笔计算的最初几项（也就是由定义确定的名称意义）推起，那他就白费了力气，什么也不知道，只是相信而已。 论错误与荒谬 当一个人不用语词来计算的时候（这在个别事物上是可能的，例如一看到某个东西，我们就推测在它之前可能发生了什么，或者在它之后可能会发生什么），如果他认为可能随后发生的事并没有发生，或者他认为可能在先发生的事并没有发生，这就叫作错误；即使最审慎的人也难免犯这种错误。可是当我们用具有一般意义的语词来推理，却得出一个错误的一般推论时，这虽然通常也叫作错误，实际上却是荒谬，也就是没有意义的言语。因为错误不过是一种误会，误以为某件事已经发生或将要发生；虽然它并没有发生，或者不会发生，但它的不可能性是看不出来的。可是当我们作出一个一般的断言，除非它是真的，否则它的可能性是无法设想的。那些我们除了声音之外什么也设想不到的语词，我们称之为荒谬的、无意义的，是胡话。因此，如果有人跟我谈什么圆的四边形，或者奶酪里的面包的偶性，或者非物质的实体，或者自由的臣民、自由的意志，或者除了不受阻碍之外的任何“自由”，我不会说他犯了错误，而会说他的话没有意义，也就是荒谬。 我在前面（第二章）说过，人在这样一种能力上胜过其他一切动物：当他设想任何东西时，他总是倾向于探究它的后果，以及他能用它做出什么效果。现在我再补充这种优越性的另一层：他能借助语词，把他发现的后果归结为一般的规则，称为定理或格言；也就是说，他能推理，或者说计算，不仅是对数，而且是对其他一切可以彼此相加、可以从中减去的东西。 可是这种特权，又被另一种特权冲淡了，那就是荒谬的特权；除了人，没有任何生物会受它支配。而在人当中，最容易受它支配的，是那些自称研究哲学的人。西塞罗在某处说过一句再真实不过的话：没有什么东西荒谬到在哲学家的书里找不到的。原因很明显。因为他们没有一个人是从他们要用的名称的定义或解释开始推理的；这种方法只在几何学中用过，几何学的结论也因此变得无可争辩。 荒谬的原因 荒谬结论的第一个原因，我归之于缺乏方法：他们不从定义开始推理，也就是不从语词确定的意义开始推理；就好像他们不知道“一、二、三”这些数词的值，就能算账一样。 一切物体都是从各种不同的角度进入计算的（这些我在前一章已经讲过），这些角度有各种不同的名称，所以由于把它们的名称混淆、不恰当地连成断言，就产生了各种荒谬。因此： 荒谬断言的第二个原因，我归之于把物体的名称给了偶性，或者把偶性的名称给了物体；比如有人说信仰是注入的或灌输的，可是除了物体之外，没有什么东西能被倒进或吹进任何东西；又说广延就是物体，幻象就是精灵，等等。 第三个原因，我归之于把我们身外物体的偶性的名称，给了我们自己身体的偶性；比如有人说颜色在物体之中，声音在空气之中，等等。 第四个原因，是把物体的名称给了名称或言语；比如有人说有普遍的事物，说一个生物是属，或者是一个一般的东西，等等。 第五个原因，是把偶性的名称给了名称和言语；比如有人说一个事物的本性在于它的定义，一个人的命令就是他的意志，诸如此类。 第六个原因，是用隐喻、转义和其他修辞格，代替本义的语词。因为虽然在日常言谈中，说“这条路通向这里或那里”“谚语说这说那”是可以的（其实路不会走，谚语也不会说话），可是在计算和寻求真理的时候，这样的说法是不能接受的。 第七个原因，是用那些毫无意义、只是从经院里学来死记硬背的名称，比如“位格的”“变体”“同体”“永恒的现在”之类经院学者的行话。 一个人如果能避免这些事情，就不容易陷入什么荒谬，除非是因为账算得太长，也许忘了前面的东西。因为一切人在本性上推理都是一样的，而且只要有好的原则，都推理得很好。谁会蠢到在几何学上犯了错误，别人向他指出来之后，还坚持不改呢？ 科学 由此可见，推理不像感觉和记忆那样是与生俱来的，也不像审慎那样仅凭经验就能获得，而是要靠勤勉才能得到：首先是恰当地给事物命名；其次是掌握一种良好而有条理的方法，从基本要素——也就是名称——出发，推进到由名称彼此连接而成的断言，再推进到由断言彼此连接而成的三段论，直到我们认识了与手头题目有关的名称的全部推论；这就是人们所说的科学。感觉和记忆只是关于事实的知识，而事实是过去的、不可挽回的东西；科学则是关于推论的知识，关于一个事实依赖于另一个事实的知识：凭着它，我们根据现在能做的事，就知道在我们愿意的时候，或者在另一个时候，怎样去做别的事，或者同样的事。因为当我们看到任何事情是怎样发生的、出于什么原因、以什么方式发生的，那么当类似的原因落到我们手中时，我们就知道怎样使它产生类似的结果。 所以，儿童在学会说话之前根本没有推理能力；他们之所以被称为有理性的生物，是因为他们显然有可能在将来运用推理。而大多数人，虽然能把推理运用到一定程度，比如数数，可它在日常生活中对他们用处不大；在日常生活中，他们支配自己的方式，有好有坏，是根据他们经验的差别、记忆的敏捷、对各种目的的倾向，尤其是根据运气的好坏，以及彼此的错误。至于科学，或者说关于他们行为的确定规则，他们离它还远得很，根本不知道那是什么。几何学被他们当作魔法；至于其他学科，那些没有学过入门、没有在其中有所进步、因而看不到这些学科是怎样获得和产生的人，在这一点上就像孩子一样：孩子不懂生育，便被妇人们哄着相信，他们的兄弟姐妹不是生出来的，而是在花园里捡来的。 可是，那些没有科学的人，凭着他们天生的审慎，比那些因为推理错误、或者因为相信推理错误的人而陷入错误荒谬的一般规则的人，处境要好，也更高贵。因为不知道原因和规则，并不会使人偏离正路太远；而依赖错误的规则，把并非原因、反而是相反结果之原因的东西，当作他们所追求之事的原因，才会使人偏离正路很远。 总之，人类心灵之光是清晰明白的语词，但要先用精确的定义剪去灯花、清除歧义；推理是步伐；科学的增长是道路；人类的福祉是目的。反之，隐喻和无意义、含糊的语词，就像鬼火；凭着它们推理，就是在无数的荒谬之中游荡；它们的结局，是争吵、叛乱，或者轻蔑。 审慎与睿智及其区别 经验多了，就是审慎；同样，科学多了，就是睿智。因为虽然我们通常用“智慧”一个名称来指这两者，可是拉丁人总是把 Prudentia 和 Sapientia 区分开来，把前者归于经验，把后者归于科学。为了把它们的区别说得更清楚，让我们假设一个人天生善于熟练地使用武器；另一个人在这种熟练之外，又学会了一门科学，知道在每一种可能的姿势或防守中，他可以在哪里伤到对手，或者被对手伤到：前者的能力与后者的能力相比，就像审慎与睿智之比；两者都有用，但后者是不会出错的。可是那些只信书本权威、盲目追随盲人的人，就像一个相信剑术教师错误规则的人，冒冒失失地去对付一个对手，结果不是被杀，就是受辱。 科学的标志 科学的标志，有些是确定无误的，有些是不确定的。确定的，是自称懂得某门科学的人能够教授它，也就是能够向别人清楚地证明它的真理；不确定的，是只有一些个别的事情符合他的说法，在许多场合证明如他所说的那样。审慎的标志都是不确定的；因为要凭经验观察并记住可能改变成败的一切情况，是不可能的。可是，在任何一件事情上，如果一个人没有确定无误的科学可以依据，却放弃自己天生的判断，而受书本上那些有许多例外的一般格言指导，这就是愚蠢的标志，一般被人讥为迂腐。即使是那些在国家会议上喜欢炫耀自己政治和历史学问的人，在关系到自己切身利益的家务事上，也很少有人这样做；他们处理私事是足够审慎的，可是在公共事务上，他们更在意的是自己才智的名声，而不是别人事业的成败。