Ethics: The Free Man (Part IV, Propositions 67–73; Part V, Proposition 42)
伦理学：自由的人（第四部分命题六十七至七十三；第五部分命题四十二）
原题：Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata（拉丁语）
斯宾诺莎 Benedictus de Spinoza（1632–1677）
译者：R. H. M. Elwes（1853–1892），1884 年
1677 年，身后出版；1884 年英译，1887 年修订

冷冻图书馆 · 开架书库 · S-005202 · https://coldlibrary.com/s/005202
权利：用拉丁文写成，1677 年出版，斯宾诺莎卒于同年。译者 R. H. M. 埃尔维斯卒于 1892 年；他的译本 1884 年出版，1887 年修订。已按澳大利亚、欧盟、英国、中国大陆和美国的规则核对（截至 2026 年 10 月 11 日）。仅供参考，不是法律意见。
来源：Project Gutenberg，https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/3800/pg3800.txt（取于 2026-10-11）
中文译文：Claude（AI），2026 · CC0 1.0
生成于 2026-10-14，来自 https://coldlibrary.com/open-stacks/spinoza-ethics-the-free-man

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Part IV, Propositions LXVII–LXXIII

PROP. LXVII. A free man thinks of death least of all things; and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life.

Proof.—A free man is one who lives under the guidance of reason, who is not led by fear (IV. lxiii.), but who directly desires that which is good (IV. lxiii. Coroll.), in other words (IV. xxiv.), who strives to act, to live, and to preserve his being on the basis of seeking his own true advantage; wherefore such an one thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdom is a meditation of life. Q.E.D.

PROP. LXVIII. If men were born free, they would, so long as they remained free, form no conception of good and evil.

Proof.—I call free him who is led solely by reason; he, therefore, who is born free, and who remains free, has only adequate ideas; therefore (IV. lxiv. Coroll.) he has no conception of evil, or consequently (good and evil being correlative) of good. Q.E.D.

Note.—It is evident, from IV. iv., that the hypothesis of this Proposition is false and inconceivable, except in so far as we look solely to the nature of man, or rather to God; not in so far as the latter is infinite, but only in so far as he is the cause of man's existence.

This, and other matters which we have already proved, seem to have been signified by Moses in the history of the first man. For in that narrative no other power of God is conceived, save that whereby he created man, that is the power wherewith he provided solely for man's advantage; it is stated that God forbade man, being free, to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and that, as soon as man should have eaten of it, he would straightway fear death rather than desire to live. Further, it is written that when man had found a wife, who was in entire harmony with his nature, he knew that there could be nothing in nature which could be more useful to him; but that after he believed the beasts to be like himself, he straightway began to imitate their emotions (III. xxvii.), and to lose his freedom; this freedom was afterwards recovered by the patriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ; that is, by the idea of God, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and desire for others the good which he desires for himself, as we have shown above (IV. xxxvii.).

PROP. LXIX. The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great, when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them.

Proof.—Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion contrary to itself, and possessing more power in restraining emotion (IV. vii.). But blind daring and fear are emotions, which can be conceived as equally great (IV. v. and iii.): hence, no less virtue or firmness is required in checking daring than in checking fear (III. lix. note); in other words (Def. of the Emotions, xl. and xli.), the free man shows as much virtue, when he declines dangers, as when he strives to overcome them. Q.E.D.

Corollary.—The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as in combat; or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of mind, whether he elect to give battle or to retreat.

Note.—What courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby, I explained in III. lix. note. By danger I mean everything, which can give rise to any evil, such as pain, hatred, discord, &c.

PROP. LXX. The free man, who lives among the ignorant, strives, as far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them.

Proof.—Everyone judges what is good according to his disposition (III. xxxix. note); wherefore an ignorant man, who has conferred a benefit on another, puts his own estimate upon it, and, if it appears to be estimated less highly by the receiver, will feel pain (III. xlii.). But the free man only desires to join other men to him in friendship (IV. xxxvii.), not repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like value, but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason, and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary importance. Therefore the free man, lest he should become hateful to the ignorant, or follow their desires rather than reason, will endeavour, as far as he can, to avoid receiving their favours.

Note.—I say, as far as he can. For though men be ignorant, yet are they men, and in cases of necessity could afford us human aid, the most excellent of all things: therefore it is often necessary to accept favours from them, and consequently to repay such favours in kind; we must, therefore, exercise caution in declining favours, lest we should have the appearance of despising those who bestow them, or of being, from avaricious motives, unwilling to requite them, and so give ground for offence by the very fact of striving to avoid it. Thus, in declining favours, we must look to the requirements of utility and courtesy.

PROP. LXXI. Only free men are thoroughly grateful one to another.

Proof.—Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another, and associated among themselves by the closest necessity of friendship (IV. xxxv. and Coroll. i.), only such men endeavour, with mutual zeal of love, to confer benefits on each other (IV. xxxvii.), and, therefore, only they are thoroughly grateful one to another. Q.E.D.

Note.—The goodwill, which men who are led by blind desire have for one another, is generally a bargaining or enticement, rather than pure goodwill. Moreover, ingratitude is not an emotion. Yet it is base, inasmuch as it generally shows, that a man is affected by excessive hatred, anger, pride, avarice, &c. He who, by reason of his folly, knows not how to return benefits, is not ungrateful, much less he who is not gained over by the gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, or by a thief to conceal his thefts, or by any similar persons. Contrariwise, such an one shows a constant mind, inasmuch as he cannot by any gifts be corrupted, to his own or the general hurt.

PROP. LXXII. The free man never acts fraudulently, but always in good faith.

Proof.—If it be asked: What should a man's conduct be in a case where he could by breaking faith free himself from the danger of present death? Would not his plan of self-preservation completely persuade him to deceive? this may be answered by pointing out that, if reason persuaded him to act thus, it would persuade all men to act in a similar manner, in which case reason would persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite their forces, or to have laws in common, that is, not to have any general laws, which is absurd.

PROP. LXXIII. The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in a State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in solitude, where he is independent.

Proof.—The man, who is guided by reason, does not obey through fear (IV. lxiii.): but, in so far as he endeavours to preserve his being according to the dictates of reason, that is (IV. lxvi. note), in so far as he endeavours to live in freedom, he desires to order his life according to the general good (IV. xxxvii.), and, consequently (as we showed in IV. xxxvii. note ii.), to live according to the laws of his country. Therefore the free man, in order to enjoy greater freedom, desires to possess the general rights of citizenship. Q.E.D.

Note.—These and similar observations, which we have made on man's true freedom, may be referred to strength, that is, to courage and nobility of character (III. lix. note). I do not think it worth while to prove separately all the properties of strength; much less need I show, that he that is strong hates no man, is angry with no man, envies no man, is indignant with no man, despises no man, and least of all things is proud. These propositions, and all that relate to the true way of life and religion, are easily proved from IV. xxxvii. and xlvi.; namely, that hatred should be overcome with love, and that every man should desire for others the good which he seeks for himself. We may also repeat what we drew attention to in the note to IV. l., and in other places; namely, that the strong man has ever first in his thoughts, that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature; so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtful and evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to him impious, horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing to his own disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe. Wherefore he strives before all things to conceive things as they really are, and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such as are hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar emotions, which I have mentioned above. Thus he endeavours, as we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good, and to go on his way rejoicing. How far human virtue is capable of attaining to such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove in the following Part.


Part V, Proposition XLII

PROP. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able to control our lusts.

Proof.—Blessedness consists in love towards God (V. xxxvi. and note), which love springs from the third kind of knowledge (V. xxxii. Coroll.); therefore this love (III. iii. lix.) must be referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active; therefore (IV. Def. viii.) it is virtue itself. This was our first point. Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more in this divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand (V. xxxii.); that is (V. iii. Coroll.), so much the more power has it over the emotions, and (V. xxxviii.) so much the less is it subject to those emotions which are evil; therefore, in proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine love or blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts. And, since human power in controlling the emotions consists solely in the understanding, it follows that no one rejoices in blessedness, because he has controlled his lusts, but, contrariwise, his power of controlling his lusts arises from this blessedness itself. Q.E.D.

Note.—I have thus completed all I wished to set forth touching the mind's power over the emotions and the mind's freedom. Whence it appears, how potent is the wise man, and how much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is driven only by his lusts. For the ignorant man is not only distracted in various ways by external causes without ever gaining the true acquiescence of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were unwitting of himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be.

Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true acquiescence of his spirit.

If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered. Needs must it be hard, since it is so seldom found. How would it be possible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without great labour be found, that it should be by almost all men neglected? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.

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中文译文 · Claude（AI）译

第四部分，命题六十七至七十三

命题六十七　自由的人最少想到死；他的智慧不是对死的默想，而是对生的默想。

证明——自由的人是依照理性的指导而生活的人，他不受恐惧的支配（IV. lxiii.），而是直接欲求善的东西（IV. lxiii. 绎理）；换句话说（IV. xxiv.），他在寻求自己真正利益的基础上，努力去行动、去生活、去保存自己的存在；所以，这样的人最少想到死，他的智慧是对生的默想。证讫。

命题六十八　如果人生来就是自由的，那么只要他们一直保持自由，他们就不会形成善与恶的概念。

证明——我称那唯独受理性引导的人为自由的人；所以，生来自由并且保持自由的人，只有正确的观念；因此（IV. lxiv. 绎理），他没有恶的概念，因而（善与恶是相互关联的）也没有善的概念。证讫。

附释——从 IV. iv. 可以明白，这个命题的假设是错误的、不可设想的，除非我们只着眼于人的本性，或者毋宁说只着眼于神——不是就神是无限的而言，而只是就神是人存在的原因而言。

这一点，以及我们已经证明过的其他一些事情，似乎就是摩西在关于第一个人的故事里所要表明的。因为在那个故事里，除了神创造人的那种力量，也就是神唯独为人的利益而作安排的那种力量之外，并没有设想神的别的力量；故事里说，神禁止自由的人吃知善恶树上的果子，又说人一旦吃了它，就会立刻畏惧死亡，而不是欲求生存。故事里还写道，当人找到了一个与他的本性完全和谐的妻子时，他就知道，自然中不可能有任何东西比她对他更有用；但是在他相信禽兽和他自己相似之后，他立刻开始模仿它们的情感（III. xxvii.），并且失去了自由；这种自由后来由先祖们在基督的精神，也就是在神的观念的引导下恢复了；唯独依靠神的观念，人才能是自由的，才能为别人欲求他为自己所欲求的善，正如我们在上面已经证明的那样（IV. xxxvii.）。

命题六十九　自由的人的德性，在避开危险时，和在克服危险时，显得同样伟大。

证明——情感只能被一个与它相反、而且在约束情感方面更有力量的情感所抑制或消除（IV. vii.）。但是盲目的鲁莽和恐惧都是情感，可以设想它们同样强大（IV. v. 及 iii.）：因此，抑制鲁莽所需要的德性或坚毅，并不少于抑制恐惧所需要的（III. lix. 附释）；换句话说（情感的界说，xl. 及 xli.），自由的人在避开危险时所表现的德性，和他努力克服危险时一样多。证讫。

绎理——自由的人在适时撤退时，和在战斗中同样勇敢；或者说，自由的人无论选择迎战还是撤退，都表现出同样的勇气或镇定。

附释——什么是勇气（animositas），我所说的勇气是什么意思，我已经在 III. lix. 附释中解释过了。我所说的危险，是指一切可能引起某种恶的东西，例如痛苦、憎恨、不和等等。

命题七十　生活在无知者中间的自由人，尽可能避免接受他们的恩惠。

证明——每个人都按照自己的性情来判断什么是善（III. xxxix. 附释）；所以，一个无知的人给了别人恩惠，就会按照他自己的估价来看待它；如果受惠的人对它的估价似乎不如他高，他就会感到痛苦（III. xlii.）。但是自由的人只欲求用友谊把别人和自己联结起来（IV. xxxvii.），而不是用被认为价值相等的另一些恩惠去回报他们的恩惠；他以理性的自由决断引导自己和别人，只做他知道是最重要的事情。所以，自由的人，为了不致被无知者憎恨，也为了不致顺从他们的欲望而不顺从理性，就会尽可能努力避免接受他们的恩惠。

附释——我说“尽可能”。因为人虽然无知，毕竟是人，在急需的时候能够给我们人的帮助，而这是一切事物中最好的：所以，常常有必要接受他们的恩惠，因而也有必要以同样的方式回报这些恩惠；因此，我们在谢绝恩惠时必须小心，免得显得轻视施惠的人，或者显得出于贪婪而不愿回报他们，结果正因为努力避免冒犯别人，反倒给了别人生气的理由。所以，在谢绝恩惠时，我们必须顾及实用和礼貌的要求。

命题七十一　只有自由的人彼此之间才是最感恩的。

证明——只有自由的人彼此之间才是最有用的，才是以友谊的最紧密的必然性彼此联结的（IV. xxxv. 及绎理一）；只有这样的人，才怀着相互的爱的热忱，努力彼此施惠（IV. xxxvii.）；所以，只有他们彼此之间才是最感恩的。证讫。

附释——受盲目欲望引导的人彼此之间的善意，通常是一种交易或引诱，而不是纯粹的善意。此外，忘恩并不是一种情感。然而它是卑劣的，因为它通常表明一个人受到了过度的憎恨、愤怒、骄傲、贪婪等等的激动。一个因为愚蠢而不知道怎样回报恩惠的人，并不是忘恩的；一个不被娼妓的礼物收买去满足她的情欲、不被窃贼的礼物收买去替他隐瞒偷窃、也不被其他类似的人收买的人，就更不是忘恩的了。恰恰相反，这样的人表现出一种坚定的心志，因为任何礼物都不能使他堕落，去损害他自己或公众。

命题七十二　自由的人决不欺诈行事，而总是真诚守信。

证明——如果有人问：假如一个人背信弃义就能使自己摆脱眼前的死亡危险，那么他应该怎样做？他保全自己的打算，难道不会完全说服他去欺骗吗？对此可以这样回答：如果理性说服他这样做，那么理性就会说服所有的人都这样做；那样一来，理性就会说服人们不要真诚地约定联合他们的力量，不要有共同的法律，也就是说，根本不要有任何普遍的法律，这是荒谬的。

命题七十三　受理性指导的人，在依照共同的法律而生活的国家里，比在独立自主的孤独之中更为自由。

证明——受理性指导的人，不是出于恐惧而服从（IV. lxiii.）：而是就他努力按照理性的命令保存自己的存在而言，也就是说（IV. lxvi. 附释），就他努力自由地生活而言，他欲求依照共同的利益来安排自己的生活（IV. xxxvii.），因而（如我们在 IV. xxxvii. 附释二中所指出的）欲求依照他国家的法律来生活。所以，自由的人，为了享有更大的自由，欲求享有一般的公民权利。证讫。

附释——我们关于人的真正自由所作的这些以及类似的论述，都可以归于刚毅，也就是归于勇气和品格的高尚（III. lix. 附释）。我认为不值得把刚毅的一切特性都分别加以证明；更不必证明刚强的人不恨任何人，不对任何人发怒，不嫉妒任何人，不对任何人愤慨，不轻视任何人，尤其不骄傲。这些命题，以及一切与真正的生活方式和宗教有关的命题，都很容易从 IV. xxxvii. 和 xlvi. 得到证明；那就是：憎恨应当以爱来克服，每个人都应当为别人欲求他为自己所寻求的善。我们也可以重申我们在 IV. l. 的附释中以及在别的地方所提请注意的一点：刚强的人心中首先想到的总是，一切事物都出于神的本性的必然性；所以，凡是他认为有害的和恶的东西，以及因此在他看来不虔敬的、可怕的、不公正的和卑劣的东西，之所以呈现出这样的面貌，都是由于他自己对宇宙的看法是紊乱的、零碎的、混淆的。因此，他首先努力按照事物的本来面目去认识它们，并且努力消除真知识的障碍，例如我们上面提到过的憎恨、愤怒、嫉妒、嘲笑、骄傲以及类似的情感。所以，正如我们前面所说的，他尽其所能地努力行善，并且欣然走自己的路。人的德性在多大程度上能够达到这样的境地，它的力量可能是什么，我将在下一部分加以证明。


第五部分，命题四十二

命题四十二　至福不是德性的报酬，而是德性本身；我们欣享至福，并不是因为我们控制了情欲；恰恰相反，正因为我们欣享至福，我们才能控制情欲。

证明——至福在于对神的爱（V. xxxvi. 及附释），这种爱产生于第三种知识（V. xxxii. 绎理）；所以，这种爱（III. iii. lix.）必须归于心灵，就心灵是主动的而言；所以（IV. 界说 viii.），它就是德性本身。这是我们的第一点。其次，心灵越是欣享这种神圣的爱或至福，它的理解就越多（V. xxxii.）；也就是说（V. iii. 绎理），它控制情感的力量就越大，并且（V. xxxviii.）它受那些恶的情感的支配就越少；所以，心灵越是欣享这种神圣的爱或至福，它控制情欲的力量也就越大。既然人控制情感的力量唯独在于理解，那么，没有人是因为控制了自己的情欲才欣享至福的；恰恰相反，他控制情欲的力量，正是从这种至福本身产生的。证讫。

附释——关于心灵控制情感的力量和心灵的自由，我想要阐述的一切，到这里就全部完成了。由此可以看出，智者是多么有力量，他比只受情欲驱使的无知者高出多少。因为无知者不仅在许多方面受外因的扰乱，永远得不到灵魂真正的满足，而且他生活着，仿佛既不知道自己，也不知道神和万物；他一旦停止受动，也就停止存在了。

而智者，就他被看作智者而言，他的灵魂几乎不受扰乱；他由于某种永恒的必然性而意识到自己、神和万物，永远不会停止存在，而是永远享有灵魂真正的满足。

如果我所指出的通向这一结果的道路看来极其艰难，它毕竟是可以找到的。它必定是艰难的，因为很少有人找到它。如果得救就在手边，不费大力就能找到，怎么可能几乎为所有的人所忽视呢？然而，一切卓越的事物，其艰难正如其稀少。